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The literature on regional growth convergence and economic disparities has tended 
to confound four interwoven measurement phenomena. i) mean reversion (so-called beta 
convergence) where richer regions move towards the average from above and poorer 
regions from below. ii) diminishing inequality (so called sigma convergence) where the 
horizontal or spatial distribution of income becomes more equal. iii) mobility, where the 
rank of a region in the overall distribution of income changes either upwards or downwards. 
iv) leveling, where the richer regions become poorer (leveling-down) or the poorer regions 
become richer (leveling-up). We use a new statistical methodology, which treats these four 
phenomena on an integrated basis. The methodology is applied to Israeli regional earnings 
and house price data. We find that whereas earnings are strongly sigma divergent during the 
1990s, this trend is offset when regional cost of living differences are taken into 
consideration. In this event, regional housing markets induce convergence in similar 
measure to the divergence induced by regional labor earnings.  
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1. Introduction 
  The study of trends in income disparities both between countries and between 
regions within countries has captured widespread attention (Armstrong 1995, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1991, Baumol 1986, Quah 1996, Tsionas 2000,2001). These studies have 
been motivated by what might be called the “expanding universe” and “contracting 
universe” schools of economic activity. According to the latter school, variables such as 
GDP per head should be converging upon some common value as predicted by neoclassical 
theory. Regional inequalities are unlikely to persist due to self-correcting mechanisms in 
labor and capital markets (Sala-I-Martin 1996). According to the “expanding universe” 
school convergence is not necessarily expected and GDP per head may even diverge, as 
predicted by the so-called New Growth Economics (Romer, 1986). 
The forces of convergence are likely to be greater within countries than between them 
for several reasons. First, capital mobility and trade, which engender convergence between 
countries, are likely to be greater within countries than between them. Secondly, labor is 
generally immobile between countries, but is mobile within them, so that workers will tend 
to migrate to regions where wages are higher. Labor mobility therefore reinforces capital 
mobility and trade in inducing wage convergence within countries. Third, if the country 
happens to be small so that commuting is feasible, people will prefer to work in better 
paying regions and live where living costs, especially housing, are cheaper. This too will 
reinforce convergent forces.  
Various reasons have been offered for regional income divergence. Some argue that 
market forces tend towards spatial disequilibrium and that uneven regional development is 
self-entrenching rather than self-correcting (Myrdal 1957, Kaldor 1970). Others claim that 
convergence between nations and regions can only be observed when attention is restricted 
to richer countries or regions and ‘club convergence’ is then observed (Chatterji 1992). 
This view has theoretical roots in Krugman’s (1991) general model of spatial concentration 
in which there may exist multiple equilibria. Poor regions may converge toward an inferior 
equilibrium as the gap between them and the leading regions is too wide to bridge. Most 
studies point to some form of slow convergence through the 1970’s and 1980’s, which 
petered out in the 1990s (Martin 2001, Tsionas 2000, 2001, de la Fuente 2002). This is true 
for regional convergence at the supra-national level such as the EU (Armstrong 1995) and 
also at the level of the individual country (Cuardo-Roura 1999, Hofer and Worgotter 1997, 
O’Leary 2001).    4 
In this paper we contribute to this debate in three ways. First, the literature has tended 
to confuse the interrelated concepts of mobility, beta convergence and sigma convergence. 
Below we bring examples from the literature of this confusion, and we seek to clarify these 
concepts. In doing so we use regional earnings data for Israel to answer the following 
questions: 
•  Has inequality between regions been increasing or decreasing? If inequality is 
measured by the variance this amounts to asking whether or not there has been 
sigma convergence
1. If, instead, inequality is measured by Gini, this amounts to 
asking whether there has been Gini convergence. 
•  How mobile are regional earnings, and has this mobility been increasing or 
decreasing? A region is said to be upwardly mobile if its rank or position in the 
distribution changes for the better, and downwardly mobile if it changes for the 
worse. We refer to this type of mobility as rank-mobility. 
•  Another kind of mobility is measured by regression toward the mean, or beta 
convergence, where poorer regions grow faster and richer ones grow slower. We 
refer to this as quantity-mobility. Note that upward rank-mobility and downward 
quantity-mobility, or vice-versa, may coexist. Income may increase relative to the 
mean at the same time as rank in the distribution happens to fall. We ask whether 
beta convergence has occurred between regions, and whether it has been increasing 
or decreasing over time. We also ask whether rank-mobility and quantity-mobility 
have been in the same direction. 
•  Finally, has the gap between poorer regions and richer regions narrowed because 
richer regions have become less well-off (leveling-down), or has there been 
leveling- up?    
    We show that all these questions are essentially different and deal with different 
aspects of regional disparity.  
  A second objective is to define regional earnings taking into account regional cost of 
living differentials. Almost all the literature has ignored differences in regional prices when 
analyzing patterns of convergence
2, yet those few studies that have addressed the matter 
                                                            
1 We use this term generically to refer to diminishing inequality rather than to the specific use of the standard 
deviation to measure inequality. 
2 Previous work has been surprisingly uniform in its choice of indicators for observing regional disparities 
and measurement approaches. Studies focusing on the US have invariably used State Income per capita  (Lall 
and Yilmaz 2001,Rey and Montouri 1999) or Gross State Output (Tsionas 2000). Work concentrating on EU 
countries, is generally conducted at the spatial scale dictated by European statistical data collection (NUTS1,   5 
(Johnston, McKinney and Stark 1996, and Eberts and Schweitzer 1994) have shown that 
these price differentials play an important role in regional convergence. Therefore we 
distinguish between regional earnings deflated by national price indices, and earnings 
deflated by regional specific price indices. Earnings might not converge due to weak 
equilibrating forces in regional labor markets, while earnings adjusted for regional 
differences in living costs may nonetheless converge, because house prices behave as an 
equilibrating phenomenon.  
  The literature has tended to ignore regional price differences because the necessary data 
are generally not available. Several initiatives are currently underway to rectify the matter. 
Nor are these data available in Israel. In the meanwhile we propose a methodology to 
construct regional price data from existing sources on house prices and on other goods and 
services.        
A third objective is to investigate “Amenity Theory” (Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz 2000) 
which predicts that regions with poorer endowments of amenities (public services, physical 
attributes, social attributes, public safety etc) will compensate by offering higher relative 
wages, either because wage rates are higher there and/or because the cost of living is lower. 
In Israel this means that Tel Aviv, which arguably is abundant in amenities, should have 
earnings that are relatively low, after allowing for cost-of-living differentials, whereas the 
opposite should apply in areas like the Negev region where amenities are less abundant. We 
ask whether the pattern of wage disparities in Israel is consistent with the regional 
distribution of amenities.   
 
2. Growth and Regional Inequality: The Israeli Context 
While economic disparities have featured high on the national agenda in Israel 
there has generally been an absence of any uniform framework for analysis, and a 
dearth of solid empirical evidence of regional inequalities over time. The social 
cleavages between Jews and Arabs, Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews and the ultra-
orthodox and secular Israelis have distinct geographic patterns that further conflate 
economic disparities. Earlier work has looked at individual aspects of regional 
disparities in Israel since the foundation of the state in 1948. Areas such as industrial 
subsidies (Razin and Schwartz 1992, Bregman, Fuss and Regev 1998), housing 
provision (Krakover and Aharonovich 1998), infrastructure investment (Bar El 2001), 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
NUTS2) and relates to GDP per capita or GVA per worker as the main indicators (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1991, Armstrong 1995, Martin 2001, Chatterji and Dewhurst 1996, Cuardo-Roura et al 1999).   6 
local public finance (Razin 1998) or quality of life indicators (Lipshitz 1993, Lipshitz 
and Raveh 1998) have attracted piecemeal attention. Portnov (2002) has surveyed a 
large number of diverse indicators finding spatial divergence in some (population, 
income distribution, labor force participation) and convergence in others (education, 
housing density etc). However, there has been no systematic attempt to measure the 
existence of regional disparities and to use composite variables that reflect different 
aspects of economic and social life (for example, earnings on the production side and 
housing costs on the consumption side). 
Much of the debate around regional inequalities focuses on the public policy 
instruments used since the 1950’s designed to reduce them. However, their efficiency in 
the face of processes of globalization and new economy-fuelled growth, is constantly 
declining (Gabriel, Justman and Levy 1987, Razin and Schwartz 1992 ). In regional 
terms, the economic growth of the 1990’s affected only certain groups in the population 
in a particular narrow band of economic and occupational sectors that have their own 
distinctive locational patterns (Jerby and Levi 2000, Kop 2000).  This point is further 
underscored by the fact that disparities in Israeli society have a distinct spatial pattern. 
Existing economic and ethnic cleavages (for example, between Jews and Arabs) are 
reinforced by spatial regional disparities. In this way regional and economic forces 
coalesce (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1994).  
It should be noted that Israel is a small country occupying a land mass of some 
20,000 sq km and with a population of 6.5m. As a result, Israeli regions are small and 
exhibit great variation in population densities. Amongst the nine regions used in this 
study (see below, Map 1) there is an inverse relationship between physical size and 
population size with a few small, densely populated regions home to the majority of the 
national population. In this respect Israel is hardly different to other small, developed 
countries such as Denmark (42,300 sq km and 5.3m population), Switzerland (40,000 sq 
km and 7.2 m population), Ireland (69,000 sq km and 4.0 m population), and Belgium 
(30,000 sq km and 10.2m population). Given the small dimensions of the country, we 
would expect significant inter-regional movement. However, empirical data on inter-
regional commuting across the 1990’s show that most regions are self-contained labor 
markets with more than 85% percent of residents working in the region. This is a higher 
level of insularity than the 75% share commonly adopted for defining local labor market 
areas or travel to work areas (Smart 1974).  Sub-regions within the metropolitan areas 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
   7 
exhibit large commuting flows with contiguous areas (as is the case between the Tel 
Aviv, Dan and Sharon areas and the Haifa and Krayot areas). Outside these two 
metropolitan centers however, higher levels of employment insularity are registered.  
 
 
3. Method and Data 
3.1 A Neoclassical Benchmark Model 
The neoclassical model of regional equilibrium (Siebert, 1969) assumes varying 
combinations and degrees of mobility in capital, labor and goods. Here, we introduce into 
the model the stock of building land (H), which is fixed but is assumed to vary by region. 
There are N regions and the national population (L) is assumed to be fixed. The cost of 
living in region i is equal to Pi = P
aPHi
1-a, where 0 < a < 1, P denotes the price of traded 
goods, which is assumed to be equalized by free trade between regions, and PH denotes the 
price of housing services. There is a common, constant-returns–to-scale production 
technology given by Qi = AKi
bLi
1-b, where K and L denote capital and labor respectively 
and 0 < b < 1. Q is tradeable and is sold at common price P in all regions. Finally, the 
demand for housing services or space in region i is assumed to vary directly with the 





 The structural parameters, a, b, c, and d do not vary by region, hence the regional 
equilibrium described below is symmetric, except for the fact that Hi varies. In equilibrium 
the supply of housing services is equal to demand, hence Hi
D = Hi. In all other respects, 
such as amenity endowments, all regions are assumed to be identical.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 reports various regional equilibria under different assumptions about factor 
mobility. Capital, labor and goods markets are assumed to be competitive and firms are 
assumed to maximize profits. π2, π4, and π7 are ambiguously positive. So are the other π 
coefficients provided the income elasticity of demand for housing (d) does not exceed unity 
by too much. If both factors are mobile the regional distribution of employment 
(population) depends entirely on the regional distribution of building land. In this case 
house prices are equalized across regions and so are earnings. If labor is immobile, the 
mobility of capital ensures that earnings are equalized, but house prices will be relatively 
expensive in regions where the relative demand for housing is higher, i.e. with greater L/H.   8 
This means that although earnings are equalized, real earnings (Wi/Pi) are lower in regions 
where relative housing demand is greater. Finally, if capital is immobile and labor is mobile 
real earnings (Wi/Pi) must be equalized, but earnings and house prices must vary between 
regions. House prices will be relatively high in regions well endowed with capital, because 
labor will be attracted there, and relatively low in regions well endowed with building land. 
The same applies to the regional distribution of earnings. The regional distribution of 
employment (population) varies directly with relative endowments of capital and building 
land. 
  Note that if commuting occurs, Wi = Wj and  PHi = PHj even if capital is immobile. 
Hence, commuting creates the same regional equilibrium as labor and capital mobility. In 
general, however, Table 1 establishes that real earnings will tend to differ across regions 
under Classical equilibrium, unless labor happens to be perfectly mobile. Capital mobility 
and trade are not sufficient conditions for real earnings equality in our model because the 
regional distribution of building land is not necessarily uniform. 
 
      
3.2 Beta and Sigma Convergence 
  In the economic growth literature, the existence of regional convergence or 
divergence has traditionally been measured using two indices of convergence.  The first is 
β-convergence, which measures regression towards the mean, or mean reversion. The 
second is σ-convergence, which measures declining variance over time, or increasing 
equality. Ever since Galton’s Paradox expounded in the 19
th century (Quah, 1993) it has 
been known that β-convergence does not imply σ-convergence. In this section we outline 
the relationship between these two concepts. 
 Let Xit represent the value of X observed in region i at time period t. The statistical model 
for X is assumed to be: 
Xit = α + βXit-1 + uit                 (1) 
uit = ρuit-1 + vit                          (2) 
where the absolute value of ρ is less than unity, and vit ~ N(0,σ
2
v). If equation (1) is 
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where σX denotes the cross-section standard deviation of X, and r is the correlation 
coefficient between Xit and Xit-1. 
 Beta convergence implies 0 < β < 1, and sigma convergence implies σXt < σXt-1. Equation 
(3) shows that β is overestimated if ρ > 0. Equations (2), (3) and (4) establish the following 
propositions: 
i)  Sigma convergence necessarily implies beta convergence. Equation (4) implies 
that β < r when there is sigma convergence, and since 1 ≥ r, it follows that 0 < β < r. 
ii)  Sigma divergence does not necessarily imply beta divergence. Equation (4) 
implies β > r when there is sigma divergence, but if r < β < 1, sigma divergence 
coexists with beta convergence.  
iii)  Beta divergence necessarily implies sigma divergence because β must exceed r. 
iv)  Beta convergence does not necessarily imply sigma convergence. Equation (4) 
implies that beta convergence and sigma convergence coexist when β < r. 
v)  If ρ > 0 beta convergence is underestimated. 
We compare these propositions with statements made by Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995) in the context of regional convergence, and by Mulligan (1997) in the context of 
intergenerational convergence. There are many other examples that we could have taken. 
Mulligan correctly states (p168) that beta divergence implies sigma divergence, which 
agrees with proposition iii). He also states that beta convergence either implies sigma 
convergence or sigma stability, he rules out sigma divergence. This is incorrect, because 
according to proposition iv) beta convergence implies sigma divergence if β > r  
3.  
Matters are yet more confusing in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). They assume away a 
large part of the problem by assuming (p384) in equation (1) that E(Xit-1, uit) = 0, which is 
equivalent to restricting ρ = 0. According to proposition v) this implies that estimates of β 
are necessarily unbiased. They then use equation (1) to produce the following difference 
equation in the cross-section variance of X: 
They argue that if there is beta convergence, equation (5) is a stable first-order difference 
equation in the cross-section variance of X. If this variance converges from below there is 
sigma divergence, and if it converges from above there will be sigma convergence. 
Their mistake is to forget that β is not independent of the cross-section variance of X. To 
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which implies sigma stability provided the variance of v does not change over time. 
 
3.3 Measuring the Dynamics of Regional Disparities 
In section 3.2mobility is defined entirely in terms of changes in earnings. No 
importance is attached to changes in the rank of earnings in the distribution. It is possible 
that earnings increase over time while worsening the rank. Mulligan (1997) does not 
distinguish between mobility in earnings and mobility in their rank in the distribution. We 
follow Wodon and Yitzhaki (2001) in distinguishing between these two phenomena, and by 
measuring inequality by Gini. A policy that improves an individual’s relative earnings, but 
lowers his rank in the distribution is very different to a policy, which improves both relative 
earnings as well as rank. 
 Wodon and Yitzhaki suggest the following decomposition for β obtained from a Gini 
















where Gt is the Gini coefficient measuring inequality in Y between n regions at time t. 
Following Schechtman and Yitzhaki (1987), Gini may be defined as: 
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G =  
where Rit = F(Yit) is the rank of Yit over n in ascending order. Inequality will have 
decreased between periods t-1 and t if Gt < Gt-1
4. In equation (7) Γt.t-1 denotes the Gini 
correlation between Y in period t and income rank in period t-1. It is defined as: 
) 9 (
) , cov(




t t R Y
R Y −
− = Γ   
and is bounded between 1 and –1. It measures the degree of (backward) mobility. Y is 
perfectly immobile when Γ = 1. If Γ = 0 there is random mobility because it is not possible 
to infer Rit-1 using information on Yit. For all practical purposes this represents the case of 
complete mobility. When Γ = -1 there is perfectly perverse mobility: the richest swaps rank 
with the poorest, the second most rich with the second most poor, and so on. 
Equation (7) shows that beta depends upon three factors. It varies directly with the 
degree of rank immobility (Γ). It also varies inversely with the degree of Gini convergence 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 It is difficult to understand why Mulligan makes these errors, because on p165 he reproduces equation (4). 
Wodon and Yitzhaki (2001) also derive equation (4) independently. 
4 It is possible but unlikely, that while inequality as measured by Gini decreases the variance of Y may in fact 
increase since σt > σt-1. Hence, σ - divergence may coexist with declining inequality as  measured by Gini.   11 
as measured by Gt/Gt-1. Finally it varies directly with the rate of leveling-up as measured by 
1 / − t t Y Y , which exceeds unity in the event of leveling-up and is less than unity in the event 
of leveling down. If all three components happen to equal unity, then β* = 1 and the rate of 
mean reversion is zero. If Γ = 0 then β* = 0 regardless of the rates of Gini convergence and 
leveling. Equation (7) implies that one cannot infer Gini convergence or divergence from 
beta convergence or divergence, and vice-versa. This is very different from the relationship 
between beta and sigma convergence in section 3.2. Finally, equation (7) implies Gini 
convergence when: 










φ     
Note that in general Γt.t-1 differs from Γt-1.t, i.e. backward and forward measures of 
mobility differ, unless Yit-1 and Yit happen to be exchangeable. The problem is similar to 
the common index number effect, where for example, the rate of inflation depends upon the 
direction of measurement. Yitzhaki and Wodon (1999) have suggested a symmetric Gini 
mobility index, which weights the forward and backward measures of mobility, defined as: 
) 11 (
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S is naturally bounded between 0 (no mobility) and 2 (perfectly perverse mobility). When S 
= 1 mobility is random. Note that if Yit and Yit-1 are exchangeable Γt-1.t = Γt.t-1  = Γt in which 
case St = 1 - Γt. Note also that this measure of mobility does not require arbitrary definitions 
of mobility matrices in which intra-decile mobility is given zero weight. We measure 
regional inequality by Gini (G), mobility by S and mean reversion by β*. These parameters 
are calculated for different years, so that their behavior over time can be monitored.  
 
3.4 Regional Cost of Living and Convergence 
As mentioned in section 1, we are particularly interested in regional disparities in 
average earnings (Wit) deflated by local differences in living costs (Pit). Let Yit = Wit/Pit 
denote average real earnings in region i in time period t. Since the relationship between  the 
Ginis for Y (GY), W (GW) and P (GP) is messy we simplify the relationship between these 
variables by using their logarithms. Denoting logarithms by lower case letters, for example,   12 
logY = y, and dropping time subscripts for convenience, we use the following relationship 
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Γwp is the Gini correlation between w and p. If living costs are greater in richer regions then 
Γwp > 0. Note that equation (12) implies that Gini convergence in y may be consistent with 
Gini divergence in either or both of w and p. To see this, suppose that Gini for w and p do 
not change, but the Gini correlation between them increases, equation (12) shows that Gini 
convergence in y will have taken place. If the Gini correlation between w and p is 
unchanged, and there is Gini convergence in w and p, equation (12) shows that this does 
not necessarily imply Gini convergence in y. Further, Gini divergence in w will only imply 
Gini divergence in y when Gw > ΓwpGp, and Gini divergence in p will only imply Gini 
divergence in y when Gp > ΓwpGw. 
     
3.5 Measuring Regional Cost of Living Disparities 
   Cost of living differentials and their determination constitute an integral part of the 
regional adjustment process. The regional cost of living is likely to vary directly with 
regional economic prosperity, both because house prices and the price of non-traded 
services are likely to be higher. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), prosperous 
regions will therefore be less prosperous and depressed regions less depressed than the raw 
data suggest, and as noted in section 1, this may make a large difference to the 
measurement of regional disparity and its dynamic analysis. 
  Unfortunately, in common with most countries, regional cost of living data are not 
available in Israel. However, regional house price data are available. We therefore adopt the 
following approach, which may be more generally applicable. We distinguish between 3 
types of goods that differ in their degree of tradability:  
•  Housing is completely non-tradable. Therefore house prices (PH) will tend to 
vary between regions. 
•  Services are partially tradable. Some services, such as haircuts, are most 
probably non-traded; consumers prefer to consume these services locally. In 
this case, lower regional wages and rents can be expected to lower the price of 
                                                            
5 Note that just as var(a + b) = var(a) + var(b) + 2 cov(a,b), so G(a + b) implies equation (11).   13 
services (PS). Their cost is therefore likely to be proportionate to earnings (W). 
Other services, such as house repairs, are tradable; supply may be imported 
from another region.  
•  Traded Goods are entirely tradable since they can be exported and imported 
between regions. The so-called “law of one price” asserts that the prices of 
traded goods (PT) will be the same across regions.   
It might be thought that in a small country such as Israel there is no need for 
considering regional cost of living disparities beyond regional differences in house prices 
(Beenstock and Peleg 2000). However, there is prima facie evidence that the cost of 
services differs substantially between the regions of Israel, so that housing costs are not the 
sole source of inter-regional cost of living differentials.  
  We define the cost of living in region i to be a geometrically weighted average of 
PT, PH and PS. PT is assumed initially to be identical across regions, PH varies across 
regions, and PS (for which we have no data) is assumed to vary directly with regional 
earnings
6. Hence: 
β α β α − − =
1
it Hit Tt it W P P P                                                           (14) 






We have already noted that regional GDP data are not available in Israel. Earnings 
data are also not published on a regional basis (with the exception of industrial earnings). 
For the empirical analysis, we therefore construct earnings data for Wit using the Household 
Income Survey (HIS). This is an annual survey covering approximately 13,000 respondents 
conducted by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The finest spatial detail in HIS 
is the sub-district of which there are eighteen (Map 1). This is an administrative definition 
                                                            
6 In practice this assumes that the rate of growth of productivity in the service sector is constant, and that non-
labor costs in the service sector are common across regions. 
7 Note that because PTt is the same in each region, one does not require data for it. Let Y0t = W0t/P0t in the base 




























                                (15) 
Equation (15) expresses relative real earnings in terms of W and PH for which data are available, and obviates 
the need for PT and PS for which data may be unavailable.   14 
used by the CBS. While these districts do not correspond to economic or functional zones 
(such as labor or commuting sheds), data availability dictates their use.  Data are available 
at this level of disaggregation for the period 1991-1999. In addition, we have been able to 
obtain data at the sub-district level for the period 1975/6
8. HIS has been used to construct 
average (simple and weighted) earnings for each sub district for the years 1975, 1976 and 
1991-1999. For other years HIS does not contain information at the sub-district level. This 
means that we can investigate regional earnings disparities in the 1990s using data for the 
mid 1970s as an historical benchmark. 
 
Map 1 here 
 
 Since the early 1970s CBS has published quarterly regional house price indices 
based on transactions data for houses of different sizes in 9 regions
9. These regions 
correspond to some of the larger individual sub-districts and to combinations of sub-
districts. For example, the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem regions are identical to the Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem sub-districts, the Central region incorporates the smaller sub-districts of Ramle, 
Petach Tikva and Rehovot, while the Southern region comprises the Ashkelon and Beer 
Sheva sub-districts and so on. Thus, while W may be calculated at the sub-district level, Y 
can only be calculated at the 9-region level and this dictates the spatial disaggregation of 
our analysis. 
Price indices for traded goods have been published by the Bank of Israel. The 
weights in equation (15) represent expenditure on traded goods and housing. These are 
national weights derived from the CBS Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1997. The 
weights are α = 0.543 and β = 0.207. Their counterparts from FES 1976 are 0.612 and 
0.207. Because FES is not generally available on a regional basis it is not possible to 
disaggregate these weights by region.  
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Presentation of the Data 
                                                            
8 These data were made available by the ISDC (Social Science Data Archive) at the Hebrew University. 
9 It should be noted that while earnings data come from a survey, house price data represent actual 
transactions. There is no real correspondence between these two sources and this could be a cause of bias for 
certain sub-populations. For example, the Arab sector is covered by the earnings data but records very few 
transactions in the housing market. Consequently there could be inconsistencies in the sampling frames of W 
and P. While the measurement of user cost of housing is problematic, we prefer house prices over rents as the 
rental market in Israel is very small.   15 
  We begin by plotting the data for regional earnings over time in the 9 regions (Fig 
1). As can be seen, during the 1990s the Tel Aviv region consistently appears at the top of 
the distribution while the Northern region is consistently located at the bottom. Between 
theses two extremities there is some shifting of positions. Note that in 1976 the rankings 
were rather different, with the Dan region topping the distribution. In terms of regional 
house prices (Fig 2) the top four regions retain their ranks over the 1990’s with more 
movement and switching amongst the bottom five regions. Housing is most expensive in 
the Haifa region and least expensive in the Southern and Northern regions. Note that 
between 1976 and 1991 the ranks hardly change. 
When plotting the data (Fig 3) for average real earnings, Yit = Wit/Pit, i.e. regional 
disparities in earnings deflated by local differences in cost of living, the picture changes. 
Overall, we observe more shifting between regions. In terms of individual regions, Tel Aviv 
is replaced by the Central region at the top of the distribution. At the other end of the scale, 
the Sharon region replaces the Northern and Southern regions at or near the bottom with the 
Jerusalem region also ranked consistently low throughout the first half of the period. Note 
that in 1976 the Dan region was ranked first, while Jerusalem was ranked last.  
 
(Figs 1-3 here) 
 
4.2 Dynamics of Regional Economic Disparities 
Looking at the disparities over time, the main picture that emerges is one of  
earnings convergence between 1976 and 1990. As noted in section 1, this pattern is 
observed in many other developed countries. However, in the 1990s earnings diverge and 
become as unequal as they were in 1976. This pattern too is observed elsewhere. For 
example, the Gini index for earnings in the 9-regions (Fig 4) almost doubled between 1991 
and 1999, rising from 0.0227 to 0.0398. In 1976 the regional Gini for earnings was 0.04. 
Because the data are regional averages they conceal intra-regional inequality, hence both 
the level and the change in Gini are smaller than one typically encounters with data for 
individuals
10.  
Fig 4 here  
 
                                                            
10 Denoting Gini for individuals by G*, it may be shown  (Yitzhaki 1994) that G = G* - Σi
nGiViOi, where Gi 
 denotes Gini for individuals in region i, Vi denotes the share of earnings in region i, and O denotes the 
coefficient of stratification or overlapping. Hence G < G*.   16 
The Gini for house prices rose between 1976 and 1991, and fluctuated thereafter. 
The Gini for real earnings (Y), which incorporates house prices, shows that on the whole 
real earnings were both more equal and less divergent than unadjusted earnings. Over the 
1990’s the Gini for real earnings rose from 0.021 to 0.031. Between 1976 and 1991 the Gini 
for real earnings falls, from 0.027 to 0.021, which is a more moderate fall than for 
unadjusted earnings. From Figure 4 we can observe certain years where local living costs 
reinforce inter-regional inequality rather than off-setting it (1992, 1995 and 1996 where GY 
is larger than GW). In these years, living costs were unusually low in rich regions and 
unusually high in poor ones. 
 Equation (11) shows that the Gini for real earnings may change even if the Gini for 
earnings and living costs remain unchanged. The Gini for real earnings varies inversely 
with the correlation between earnings and living costs. Fig 5 shows that this correlation 
almost tripled. Without this the degree of Gini divergence would have been even higher. A 
possible explanation for the growing correlation between earnings and living costs could be 
government intervention in the housing market over the 1990’s. With the mass immigration 
from the former Soviet Union over this period, the government induced private building 
contractors to build in the poorer and more peripheral regions of the country. This caused a 
housing shortage in the richer high-demand regions and prices rose (Beenstock and Peleg 
2000).   
Fig 5 here 
 
  In summary, the evidence seems to show that while earnings were strongly 
divergent during the 1990s, this effect is suppressed when local living costs are taken into 
consideration. Moreover, the considerable convergence observed in earnings between 1976 
and 1991 overstates the convergence in real earnings during this period. The inclusion of 
house prices and local living costs makes a substantial difference to the measurement of the 
dynamics of regional economic disparities. 
 
4.3 Inter-Regional mobility 
Regional mobility in real earnings is measured by the Gini Mobility Index (S). 
Figure 6 shows that the Gini Mobility Index for earnings adjusted for local living costs (Y) 
is about 0.17 in the early 1990s and ranges between 0.05 and 0.10 thereafter, implying that 
real earnings are immobile from one year to the next.  We also calculate this mobility index 
over several years because it is natural to expect more mobility over a longer time period   17 
than a shorter one (Figure 7). The Gini Mobility Index tends to grow with the length of the 
measurement period, from 0.16 over the short-term to 0.47 over the longer-term. Figure 7 
also shows that between 1976 and 1991 there was a substantial amount of mobility; the 
Gini Mobility Index is 0.48. Although regions hardly change rank in the short term, they 
display more mobility in the longer run.   
Figure 6 also shows that the short-term mobility regional house prices is virtually 
zero, and Figure 7 shows that house prices are quite immobile over the long-term too. 
Figures 6 and 7 show that earnings (uncorrected for local living costs) are on the whole less 
mobile than adjusted earnings both in the short and long-runs.  
 
Figures 6 and 7 here 
 
4.4 Decomposing Inequality and Mobility 
Figure 8 plots the decomposition of β - convergence into mobility, changes in 
inequality and leveling over time, as outlined in equation (7). In the absence of mobility (Γ 
=1), Gini convergence, and leveling there must be zero β - convergence (β = 1). From 
Figure 8 we can see that over the 1990s β was close to unity. 1992-3 were years of greatest 
mean reversion (β = 0.56), which was brought about by Gini convergence, an almost zero 
rate of leveling, and a somewhat greater degree of mobility. 1991-2 were years of greatest 
mean diversion (β = 1.21), which was induced by a particularly high rate of Gini 
divergence. After 1993/4 the components of β settle down, such that β falls from 1.2 in 
1993/4 to 0.9 in 1998/9. This fall was induced by minor, unstructured changes in its 
components.  
Figure 8 here 
 
 
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis  
Our results show that local living costs make a difference to the dynamic analysis 
of regional disparities. In this sub-section we investigate the sensitivity of our results to 
plausible alternative measures of local living costs, in the absence of regional CPIs. In 
section 3.4 we were obliged to make two data assumptions, that the retail price of traded 
goods does not vary between regions, and that the weights of the 3 types of goods in the 
consumption basket are the same in each region. While it may be reasonable to assume that 
the wholesale price of traded goods does not vary by region, the same is less plausible for   18 
retail prices. Since the retail margin depends, inter alia, upon shop rents and labor costs, the 
retail prices of traded goods are likely to be lower in regions with lower costs of 
distribution. Indeed, Lach (2002) has shown for 4 traded goods in Israel that retail prices 
vary, quite substantially, both within and between regions. 
 We denote the retail price of traded goods in region i at time t by PTit , the common 
wholesale price by PTt, and, in the absence of data on commercial rents, assume that shop 
rents are proportionate to house prices. Regional retail prices of traded goods are assumed 
to be a geometric weighted average of wholesale prices, house prices and earnings: 
) 16 (
1 η κ η κ
it Hit Tt Tit W P P P
− − =  
The retail margin is ρ = κ + η. A survey carried out by CBS in 1999 suggests that ρ = 0.35 
and that κ = .0728. Applying these estimates to equation (16) and substituting the result into 
equation (14) implies that the weight on the wholesale price of traded goods falls to 0.472 
from 0.543, and the weight on housing prices rises to 0.218 from 0.207. 
  Calculating earnings adjusted for local living costs on this basis implies that 
earnings during the 1990s were both more equal and less divergent (Figure 9). We find that 
the greater the weight on house prices, and the lower the weight on the price of traded 
goods, the less Gini divergent are real earnings. Indeed, when the weight on traded goods is 
less than 0.432 and the weight on house prices is greater than 0.280 real earnings become 
Gini convergent instead of Gini divergent.     
 
Figure 9 here 
 
4.6 Explaining the Absence of Convergence 
 
In common with the empirical literature that has been cited we have assumed by 
default that the regions are demographically homogeneous and that regional economic 
differentials are not affected by the demographic composition of the employed. In Israel, as 
elsewhere, there is a large body of empirical research, which shows that earnings vary 
directly with education, have a ∩ - shaped relationship with age, are lower for women, and 
are higher for Jews. The persistent disparities that have been reported may therefore reflect 
demographic heterogeneity between regions. We investigate this possibility in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 here 
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Table 2 shows that there is a surprising degree of demographic heterogeneity among 
wage earners in Israel. There is a 5 year gap between the “oldest” and “youngest” region, 
and there is almost a 3 year gap between the “least educated” and “most educated” region. 
There is also substantial regional variation in the proportion wage earners that are women. 
Finally, because Non-Jews are unequally distributed between the regions there is a large 
regional variation in the proportion of wage earners that are Non-Jews. The coefficients 
reported in Table 2 are taken from a log wage equation estimated using micro data for 
1995. They indicate a return to schooling of almost 7%, a wage disadvantage to Non-Jews 
of 6.6% and a wage disadvantage to women of 55%. Applying these coefficients indicates, 
for example, that earnings in Jerusalem were 8.12% higher than the national average on 
account of demography while in the North earnings were 14.74% below the national 
average. The latter is due to the fact that wage earners in the North were relatively young, 
less educated, and Non-Jewish. On the other hand, they were disproportionately male.  
  The final column of Table 2 reports the demographically adjusted earnings gap in 
1995. This shows that the weighted effect of demographic attributes on monthly earnings 
can be quite considerable.  In the Jerusalem region for example this effect is positive and 
can account for about 8 percent of the monthly wage (325 NIS). Smaller positive effects are 
registered for the Haifa, Central, Tel Aviv and Dan regions. Alternatively, in the Northern 
region, demographic characteristics depress monthly earnings levels by over 485 NIS (some 
15 percent). 
  Amenity theory predicts that earnings should vary inversely with amenities. Table 3 
provides data on the regional distribution of certain amenities
11. With the exception of 
crime and classrooms, Tel Aviv has the highest amenity endowment and the North the 
lowest. Amenity theory predicts that earnings should be lowest in Tel Aviv and highest in 
the North. The fact that the data indicate the converse suggests that the persistent regional 
disparities that have been reported are most probably inconsistent with Amenity Theory.        
 
Table 3 here 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
                                                            
11 We use the coefficient of variation (CV) for earnings to represent earnings opportunities. The greater is CV 
the greater is the chance of obtaining high earnings relative to the mean.   20 
While the main thrust of this paper has been in the field of measurement we have, 
inter alia, highlighted two other issues pertinent to the regional convergence/divergence 
debate. The first relates to the importance of considering regional cost of living differences 
when measuring regional disparities. We have suggested a simple approach to creating 
regional deflators in the absence of regional consumer price indices. For all its crudeness, 
this method is nevertheless an improvement on the common practice of side-stepping the 
issue that characterizes so many studies. The driving force behind regional cost of living 
differences is house prices, which typically exhibit large differences across regions, and are 
readily available in most countries. The second issue relates to the significance of our 
empirical results in the light of  ‘amenity theory’. According to this view, the demand for 
amenities is likely to lower real earnings relative to house prices. This results in amenity-
deficient regions having higher earnings growth than amenity-rich regions.   
In the realm of measurement, we have applied a new decomposition theorem for 
mean reverting behavior to analyze the dynamics of regional disparities in real earnings in 
Israel. It turns out that there is little, if any, mobility in the ranks of the regions over the 
short run, but there is more mobility over the longer term. The region of Tel Aviv has 
consistently topped the earnings and house price rankings, while the North and South 
regions have consistently assumed the bottom two positions. Deflating earning by house 
prices causes Tel Aviv to drop one rank and induces a greater measure of equality over time 
but not in any consistent fashion. 
We have applied a new decomposition theorem for mean reversion, which 
highlights its underlying causes. These are the degree of Gini divergence, the degree of 
immobility, and the rate of leveling across regions. We have shown that changes in the 
degree of beta convergence are induced by reinforcing changes in these components. By the 
same token, stability in the degree of beta convergence may conceal important but 
offsetting changes in its determining components. We believe that this decomposition clears 
up much of the confusion surrounding the concept convergence, and is a fruitful way of 
describing the data.  
The results on Gini divergence for real earnings are sensitive to the weights used to 
calculate regional living cost. Gini convergence in house prices accompanied by an 
increasing correlation between earnings and house prices implies that earnings adjusted for 
regional living costs are less divergent than their unadjusted counterparts. This implies that 
whereas earnings and labor markets induce divergent behavior the opposite applies to 
housing markets.     21 
Finally, our results conflict with amenity theory in two respects. First, amenity 
theory predicts that regions that are better endowed with amenities will have lower real 
earnings. The opposite seems to apply. High amenity areas such as Tel Aviv consistently 
have high real earnings, while regions that are poorly endowed tend to have low real 
earnings. Secondly, there is no evidence that the well-endowed areas have lost ground to 
the less well-endowed areas. Had this been the case there would have been clear evidence 
of Gini convergence. Such convergence implies that in well-endowed regions, either 
earnings should have been relatively lower, or house prices should have been relatively 
higher. The opposite should imply in the poorly-endowed regions. These expectations have 
not materialized. Since house prices are already relatively high in the well-endowed 
regions, the failure of amenity theory lies in the labor market rather than the housing 
market. 
 It could also be that house prices are too crude an indicator to reflect a concept as 
nebulous as ‘amenity’ that encompasses many attributes ranging from public services, 
cultural capital, transportation and feelings of personal security. The latter is a case in point. 
A speculative reading of our results suggests that a low-amenity region such as Jerusalem 
(plagued with security issues) should be reflected through higher compensation in real 
earnings. There is some indication of this trend from our result with Jerusalem picking up 
over the 1990’s in terms of earnings deflated by local living costs. All this however must 
remain a matter of conjecture until serious measures of regional amenity are developed.   22 
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Table 1:  Taxonomy of Regional Equilibria 
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JERUSALEM 36.67  14.16  1.06%  53.32%  4012  +325 
North 35.04  11.31 49.05%  35.77%  3296  -485 
Haifa 40.19  13.21  8.95%  47.59%  4207  +293 
Sharon 37.55  12.48  13.29%  44.19%  4142  -79 
Center 38.47  13.07  3.15%  48.69%  4448  +159 
Tel Aviv  37.47  13.15  3.58%  48.79%  4633  +117 
Dan 38.66  12.81 1.16% 48.39%  4112  +87 
South 37.79  12.41  4.63%  47.74%  3734  -77 
Average
1  37.67 12.73  11.98%  46.41%     
 
1. All variable averages are non-weighted and represent averages for the data set. 
2. Estimated on basis of following wage regression: 
Ln(earnings) = 5.025 + 0.074Age – 0.00076 Agesquare + 0.0694 Years schooling – 0.0641 Non-Jew + 
0.5527         
                         Male + 0.1846Married – 0.9729Ultra-Orthodox + 0.088Jerusalem +0.1983 Tel Aviv + 0.412 
                         Haifa + 0.1241Dan + 0.1446Center – 0.0422South + 0.08491Sharon + 0.0555North 
 
Source:  Household Incomes Survey 1995, Central Bureau of Statistics.  
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JERUSALEM  0.61 3.7  5.85 0.208  44.7  0.974 
North  0.76 2.5  3.79 0.160  47.6  0.840 
Haifa  1.00 3.8  8.67 0.161  64.2  1.160 
Center  0.48 4.0  8.48 0.253  73.4  0.920 
Tel Aviv  1.92 4.2  6.47 0.0007  73.4  1.199 





1.  Share of cultural performances divided by share of population 1997. 
  Source: Annual Report, Culture Authority, Ministry of Education. 
2.  Doctors per 1,000 population, 2000. 
  Source: Department of Health Information, Ministry of Health. 
3.  Hospital (in-patient) Beds per 1,000 population, 2000. 
  Source: Department of Health Information, Ministry of Health. 
4.  Classrooms per 1,000 population, 2000. 
  Source: Local Authorities in Israel, Physical Data, Central Bureau of Statistics. 
5.  Police files per 1,000 population, 2000. 
  Source: Department of Information & Statistics, Israel Police, National Command. 
6.  Coefficient of Variation of Earnings 
  Source: Household Incomes Survey 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics.   28 
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G2/G1 ( σ-convergence) 
Г (immobility)
β ( mean reversion)  33 






















































Non-adjusted Gini   34 
Map 1: Geographical  Regions of Israel 
 
 